Money v. Comm Social Security by unknown
2004 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-25-2004 
Money v. Comm Social Security 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004 
Recommended Citation 
"Money v. Comm Social Security" (2004). 2004 Decisions. 980. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/980 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No:  03-2553
KATHERINE N. (TAYLOR) MONEY,
                  Appellant
        v.
JOANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Civ. No. 01-1806)
District Court: Hon. Gustave Diamond
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 12, 2004
 
Before: SCIRICA, ROTH and McKEE, Circuit Judges.
(Filed February 25, 2004)
OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
This case arises from the denial of Katherine N. Money’s application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 and 1381-1381(c) ("Act").  Money appeals the
     1 We have jurisdiction over this motion to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Fargnoli v.
Halter, 247 F.3d 34, 36 (3d Cir. 2001).  We exercise plenary review over decisions to
grant and deny motions for summary judgment. Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d
Cir. 2003).  This means that we exercise de novo review of all legal questions presented
by the Commissioner’s final judgment, but review the factual findings only to see if they
are supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Substantial evidence has been
defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.  Where
the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those
findings, even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Fargnoli, 247
F.3d at 38.  
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district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Inasmuch as we write only for the parties it is not necessary to recite the facts of
this case in detail.  Money presents three claims to this court: she argues that the ALJ’s
decision adopted by the Appeal’s Council was not supported by substantial evidence, did
not comply with the Council’s August 1998 order, and failed to account for the additional
medical evidence that the Council added into the record on the initial appeal.  Each claim
is considered separately.1
A.  Substantial evidence for the decision
Money argues that the Commissioner’s final decision was not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole for five reasons.  We disagree, and address
each of her reasons seriatim.
     2 When evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must answer the following
five inquiries in this order: whether (1) the claimant is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity; (2) he or she has a severe impairment; (3) this impairment meets or
equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) this
impairment prevents him or her from performing his or her past relevant work; and (5) he
or she can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his or
her age, education, work experience, and residual functioning capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920.
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1. Step three of the sequential process2
  Money states that the ALJ erred when evaluating her under the listing for organic
brain disorders, Listing 12.02, in step three of the sequential evaluation of disability
claims.  She argues that the ALJ ignored neuropsychological test results in the record;
failed to obtain current neuropsychological tests; and discounted or misunderstood
evidence proving she had brain damage.
A claimant must show that his or her impairment matches a listing to succeed at
step three in the process.  An impairment matches a listing only when it meets all of the
listing’s specified medical criteria. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990).  Money
therefore had to prove that she met all of Listing 12.02's criteria.  Listing 12.02 has two
groups of criteria, “A” and “B,” each of which had to be met. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Subpt. P. App. 1, § 12.02.  The ALJ found that she met the Group A criteria but not those
in Group B.  Group B requires her impairment to result “in at least two of the following:
(1) Marked restriction of activities of daily living; or (2) Marked difficulties in
maintaining social functioning; or (3) Marked difficulties in maintaining concentration,
4persistence, or pace; or (4) Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended
duration. . . .”  The only concrete evidence offered by Money to prove that she met the
group B criteria is one of her treating physicians’ diagnoses of “multi-infarct dementia”
on a state employability assessment form.  It is unclear whether it necessarily follows that
she meets the Group B criteria simply because she has this diagnosis.  The ALJ adduced
evidence from Money’s own testimony and that of her physicians that she did not meet
the Group B criteria.  The ALJ’s opinion was based on substantial evidence and applied
the correct law.  
2. The treating physicians’ opinions on residual functional capacity
Money argues that the ALJ failed to defer to the opinions of her treating physicians
which were based on objective clinical evidence regarding her remaining functional
capacity (“RFC”).  She states that this failure calls into question the ALJ’s finding that
she could perform light work, and she argues that the district court should have remanded
her claim to correct this error.
Controlling weight is given to the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician
regarding the nature and severity of the claimant’s impairment when, among other things,
it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.
927(d)(2).  Here, the ALJ found that the opinions of Money’s treating physicians were
both internally inconsistent and inconsistent with other medical evidence.  As a result,
their opinions were not entitled to controlling weight.  Because they were not entitled to
5such weight, the ALJ could evaluate and weigh them against other medical evidence in
the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927)(d).  
3.  Hypothetical posed to vocational expert
 Money argues that the testimony offered by the vocational expert (“VE”) in
response to hypothetical questions that the ALJ posed to him were not substantial
evidence.  She claims that the hypothetical did not include her specific impairments.  
An ALJ’s hypothetical question to a VE must accurately portray the claimant’s
individual impairments that are supported by the record. See Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829
F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987); Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984). 
As stated above, her treating physicians’ opinions were not undisputed and were not fully
accepted by the ALJ.  The ALJ determined that Money could perform light work that did
not require pushing, pulling or fine manual dexterity with her right hand, or complex and
varied job tasks.  The ALJ then incorporated these impairments in a hypothetical question
he posed to the VE.  His hypothetical met the requirements in Chrupcala, and he
therefore properly used the VE’s testimony in response to this hypothetical question.  
4. Vocational expert testimony’s conflict with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
Money argues that the VE’s testimony conflicts with the descriptions of the jobs in
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), thereby creating errors in steps four and
five of the sequential analysis.  She claim that the district court should have remanded her
claim to correct these errors.  She believes that the error in step four occurred when the
6ALJ did not reconcile the VE’s description of Money’s past relevant work as unskilled,
entry-level work requiring “medium” exertion with the DOT’s classification of it as
“light” skilled work requiring three to six months’ training and reasoning level 2.  The
second alleged error was that, given the ALJ’s assessment of her RFC, the DOT indicates
that none of the jobs that the VE listed would be appropriate for her.
It appears that Money argued to the district court that reconciliation was required
by Social Security Ruling 00-4p, which states that ALJs must resolve conflicts between
the DOT and VEs’ testimony.  The district court correctly noted that the ALJ was not
bound by this ruling when he rendered this decision in 1999 because SSR 00-4p was not
effective until December 2000.  Perhaps as a result, Money mentions SSR 00-4p on
appeal but concedes that we do not need to apply it here.  She argues persuasively that
this court has endorsed reconciling conflicts between VEs’ testimony and the DOT
definitions even in claims not governed by SSR 00-4p. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d
113, 126-27 (3d Cir. 2002).  We do not need to decide this question, though, because the
district court’s decision to affirm stands even if such reconciliation was needed. 
Money apparently did not raise the first issue regarding the error in step four to the
district court, and it is therefore waived. See Gass v. V.I. Telephone Corp., 311 F.3d 237,
246 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that issues not raised before a district court are waived on
appeal).  Looking at this issue on the merits, this argument is still unavailing because
Money cannot prove that this error caused any harm.  Even if he did not reconcile the
     3 Money also states that it is unclear which DOT job the VE meant when he stated
“cleaner” because there are about 32 jobs labeled “cleaner” in the DOT.  However, there
is only one listing whose title officially states only “cleaner” in the DOT, listing 323.687-
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VE’s description of her past relevant work with the DOT’s description of it, the ALJ still
came to a conclusion favorable to her, that she could not perform the job that was her
only past relevant work experience.
Because Money raises the second issue regarding step five properly, we analyze it
on its merits and again assume that the ALJ should have reconciled the VE’s testimony
with DOT testimony.  In response to the hypothetical including the criteria in the ALJ’s
RFC for Money, the VE listed material handler, order filler, shoe dyer/cleaner, kitchen
worker, cleaner, and inserting machine operator.  Money argues that under the DOT’s
definitions of these jobs, none of them meet her RFC for “simple, routine and repetitive”
work as determined by the ALJ.  She states that, in the DOT, all six jobs except for
cleaner require reasoning levels 2 or 3, so they do not comply with the ALJ’s mandate
that her work be “simple.”  She also states that the first three of those six jobs were listed
in the DOT as skilled or semi-skilled, rather than unskilled, although there was no
evidence on the record regarding any transferrable skills she might have.  Finally, she
states that the DOT states that three of the jobs entail more than the “light work” that her
RFC calls for: the material handler job entails “heavy work,” and the kitchen worker and
shoe cleaner jobs entail “medium work.”  Money argues that this leaves only the job as a
cleaner.3
014; the other listings are for “washer (alternative title: cleaner)” whose cleaning involves
industrial equipment, or jobs such as “seed cleaner” in the agricultural worker listing and
“acid-tank cleaner” in a refinery. See DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (4th ed. 1991), at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/libdot.htm. 
     4  See “Appendix C: General Education Development,” in DICTIONARY OF
OCCUPATIONAL TITLES, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES (4th ed. 1991), at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/dot/refrnc/dotappc.htm.
     5  See “Clerical and Sales Occupations”in DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (4th ed. 1991), at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/dot/refrnc/dot02a.htm; “Service Occupations” in
DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (4th ed. 1991), at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/dot/refrnc/dot03a.htm.
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Money makes the assumption that even a reasoning level of 2, where 1 is the
lowest possible level of reasoning, is incompatible with the ALJ’s decision in her RFC
that her jobs must be simple.  However even level two only requires a person to “[a]pply
commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral
instructions[; d]eal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from
standardized situations.”4  Working at reasoning level 2 would not contradict the mandate
that her work be simple, routine and repetitive.  
Allowing for jobs requiring reasoning levels 1 and 2, for unskilled workers who
can do only light work, three of the six jobs that the VE listed still meet the ALJ’s stated
RFC for Money under the DOT definitions.  They are inserting machine operator, DOT
No. 208.685-018; cleaner, DOT No. 323.687-014; and silver wrapper, one of the kitchen
worker jobs,  DOT No. 318.687-018.5  Therefore, the district court correctly found that
9many of the jobs identified by the VE met the limitations set in Money’s RFC.
5. Developing the record on Money’s organic mental disorders
Money argues that the ALJ should have further developed the record to ensure a
complete record on which to determine if she was disabled, and that the district court
erred when it failed to remand her claim for further record development.  Specifically, she
claims that the ALJ should have allowed her to have a medical expert testify and granted
her request for current neuropsychological testing for cognitive deficits because he was
evaluating her under Listing 12.02.  
The burden lies with the claimant to develop the record regarding his or her
disability because the claimant is in a better position to provide information about his or
her own medical condition. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); see also 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a) and 416.912(a).  The ALJ’s only duty in this respect is to ensure
that the claimant’s complete medical history is developed on the record before finding
that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(d), 416.912(d).  Such a history is
defined as records of the claimant’s medical sources for at least 12 months preceding
when the claimant filed the application for disability benefit unless the claimant states
that his or her disability began less than 12 months before the application was filed. Id. 
Only if the evidence before the Commissioner is insufficient does the ALJ have the duty
to attempt to obtain additional evidence to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3).
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Money alleges that her disability began in July 1994, shortly after a car accident
she had on June 26, 1994.  The ALJ evaluated medical records dated from July 1994
through February 1996, about 2.5 years, in addition to other records from 1999 including
a consultative examination ordered by the ALJ.  This meets the standard for a “complete
medical history” in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(d) and 416.912(d).  Nothing else indicates that
the record lacked enough data for the ALJ to make a well-informed decision about
whether Money was disabled.  Although Money might want the additional evidence she
mentioned and it might help the ALJ make an even more informed decision, such
evidence was not necessary.  The district court correctly denied Money’s request for
remand on this basis.
B. Following the Council’s August 1998 order
Money argues that the second ALJ failed to heed the Council’s holding that her
right hand impairment precluded her from performing jobs requiring bilateral manual
dexerity, and that the district court erred when it failed to remand her claim to the
Commissioner so it could comply with the holding or explain why it failed to comply. 
We disagree.  The district court properly found that “the record is clear that the ALJ
complied with all of the instructions set forth in the Appeals Council’s remand order and
took no action inconsistent with that order. (R. 306-309.)” Order at 12. 
The Council’s holding stated:
The Council believes that the claimant’s right hand difficulties do represent a
significant nonexertional limitation. . . . The Council believes that this severe
11
dominant hand impairment which precludes the claimant’s ability to perform jobs
requiring bilateral manual dexterity cannot be considered insignificant and that
vocational evidence is needed to determine the extent to which the claimant’s
nonexertional limitations erode the occupational base for work.
Decision at 2.
The ALJ gave significance to the hand impairment in his step three analysis,
finding that Money had the RFC to perform “a wide range of simple, routine and
repetitive light work activity, not involving pushing, pulling or fine manual dexterity with
the right dominant upper extremity.”  He took vocational evidence regarding Money’s
hand impairment: he included this limitation on manual dexterity in the hypothetical to
the VE as discussed above. 
C. Accounting for the additional medical evidence the Council added to the record
Money argues that the Council should have explained why it adopted the second
ALJ’s opinion even after it added exhibits to the record, and that the district court erred
when it failed to remand her claim to the Council for such an explanation.  We disagree.
First, because she failed to raise this argument before the district court, Money
waived her right to raise it before now. See Gass, 311 F.3d at 246.  Second, Money
appears to think she is entitled to review by the Appeals Council.  The regulations do
require the Council to evaluate the entire record including the new and material evidence
submitted, but do not require it to grant review unless it finds that the ALJ’s decision “is
contrary to the weight of the evidence currently of record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b).  The
Council can admit the evidence into the record but does not have to provide written
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review of this evidence unless it grants formal review of the ALJ’s decision. See
Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001).  
We have already decided that the only way that the new evidence could be
reviewed in this situation would be on remand to the Commissioner.  Such a remand
could only take place if it met the criteria listed in Section 405(g) of the Act. Id. at 592-
93.  The district court here properly used these 405(g) factors to analyze whether the new
evidence at issue required remand.  It found that the petitioner did not offer any reasons
why the evidence was material or why the evidence had not been generated in time to put
into the record before the ALJ.  This conclusion is supported by the record, which is
bereft of any such explanations.  The district court correctly concluded that it could not
remand this claim to the Commissioner for consideration of this evidence because the
evidence did not meet the criteria for remand under 405(g).
II.
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the district court’s judgment.
       
